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IDEOLOGIES CLASHING:
CORPORATIONS, CRIMINAL LAW,
AND THE REGULATORY OFFENCE0
By CHRIS TOLLEFSON*
This article explores the ideological dimensions of the current debate over
the constitutional status of the regulatory offence. It contends that what
animates this debate is an underlying conflict between competing liberal
ideologies in which an emergent libertarian classical liberalism is
increasingly undermining the dominance within legal discourse of a more
statist-oriented pluralist liberalism. Moreover, it suggests that it is a
debate which is closely connected to a more far-reaching ideological
controversy over the future of the regulatory state. The article concludes
by arguing that, within this debate, fundamental questions about the
nature of corporate power and legal status are obscured, questions that
a critical theory of the regulatory offence must confront.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal process is often likened to a battleground, the
site of a metaphorical struggle between the individual and the state.1
Within legal discourse, the criminal law - its doctrines and
procedures - is also a battleground: a terrain which resonates with
the sound of ideologies clashing.2  This paper considers the
ideological dimensions of a contemporary controversy within the
criminal law, the unsettled recent history and uncertain future of the
regulatory offence.
As a result of recent Charter3 jurisprudence, the
constitutional status of the regulatory offence, in its strict and
absolute liability forms,4  has been thrown in doubt. Many
commentators believe that the absolute liability offence, once the
most common species of quasi-criminal regulatory law, may be
destined for extinction 5 Similarly, dire predictions are being made
about the fate of its counterpart, the strict liability offence, in light
of decisions which suggest that its reverse onus due diligence
See J. Griffith, "Ideology in Criminal Procedure" (1970) 79 Yale L.. 359 at 367-71,
critiquing H. Packer, "rWo Models of the Criminal Process" (1964) 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1.
2 B. Bragg, "Ideology" from the album Talking with the Taxman about Poetry (St. Laurent:
Polydor, 1986).
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 Terminology in this area can be confusing. One important distinction is between
regulatory offences (also called quasi-crimes or public welfare offences) and so-called "real
crimes." While the latter are contained, almost invariably, in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46, the former, characteristically, are not and involve breaches of environmental, health
and safety, motor vehicle, or comparable legislation. There are two forms of regulatory
offence: absolute and strict liability. An accused charged with an absolute liability offence
can be convicted upon proof of the illegal act alone, whereas an accused charged with a strict
liability offence can avoid conviction by establishing, on a balance of probabilities, a defence
of "due diligence," demonstrating, in other words, that the failure to comply with the law was
not negligent. Finally, it should be noted that, in U.S. and U.K. usage, "strict liability'
connotes what we refer to as "absolute liability." What we have come to designate as "strict
liability offences" are much less common in these other jurisdictions and tend to be referred
to simply as "negligence offences."
5 For example, K.R. Webb, "Regulatory Offences, The Mental Element and the Charter
Rough Road Ahead" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 419 at 440-47.
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defence is constitutionally unsound. Some liberal criminal law
theorists suggest these developments are all to the good.6 A striking
manifestation of emergent mainstream hostility to these well
established regulatory forms is a recent report by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission7 which unequivocally advocates abolition of the
absolute liability offence and de facto abolition of the strict liability
offence.
Critical legal scholarship, it has been suggested, has largely
neglected analysis and critique of substantive criminal law doctrine.
8
This observation is particularly apt with respect to the increasingly
heated debate over the role within the criminal law of the regulatory
offence.9 With this in mind, the goal of this paper is to contribute
towards a more critical understanding of this ostensibly doctrinal
debate by locating its ideological bearings and contextualizing its
legal discourses within broader currents of moral and political
argument.
I intend to argue that what animates and structures this
debate is a tension between two competing liberal visions of law and
society: a classical liberalism, with roots in the Lockean libertarian
tradition, and a pluralist liberalism, with considerably more positivist
and utilitarian leanings, commonly associated with and more
sympathetic to the modern regulatory state. While these visions
share a common individualist lineage, they have distinctive
orientations on a range of issues, including the respective roles of
the state and the market, the nature of individual rights, the
purposes of the criminal law, and, in particular, the role within the
criminal law of the regulatory offence.
The paper is in four parts. Part II sketches out, in
paradigmatic terms, the two competing liberal ideologies which I
argue underlie and inform the contemporary Canadian debate over
the role of the regulatory offence. It then elaborates and critiques
6 For example, A. Brudner, "Imprisonment and Strict Liability' (1990) 40 U.T.LJ. 738.
7 Ontario Law Reform Commission, The Basis of Liability for Provincial Offences
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1990)[hereinafter Report].
8 D. Nelken, "Critical Criminal La-'" (1987) 14 J.L. & Soc. 105.
9 See Kent Roach's highly critical review of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's
recent report: (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 802.
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the continuities between these respective visions. Part In is devoted
to tracing this debate from the early-1970s to the present by
reference to leading cases and various law reform studies. The
purpose of this Part is to describe and analyse the historical
trajectory of the debate, a trajectory which suggests that the
dominant position enjoyed within legal discourse by pluralist
liberalism is increasingly being undermined by an emergent classical
liberal discourse. In Part IV, I will offer some reflections on the
debate. In particular, I will argue that submerged within this debate
are crucial issues of corporate legal status and market power which
classical and pluralist liberalism obscure and which necessitate a
critical reassessment of the relationship between the state, the
corporation, and the polity.
II. IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS OF THE DEBATE
Legal discourse, like political discourse, has a fluid
dimension, taking place within a matrix of visions of social and
political life, constantly in flux, competing to achieve discursive
dominance. The extent of discursive flux within legal discourse is
variable. In a recent article, Patrick Macklem suggests that the
contemporary discourse of constitutional law is characterized by its
heterogeneity, arguing that, as a discursive formation, it contains
identifiable and competing tory, socialist, classical liberal, and
pluralist liberal ideologies.'0
Discourse within the criminal law is less fluid and variable.
Dominant accounts of the criminal law have tended to construct it
in paradigmatic liberal terms, as a contest between the free rights-
bearing individual and the state under the rule of law.11 Under the
terms of this mythic contest, the state is rigidly proscribed from
intruding upon the autonomy of the free legal subject unless it
establishes, in accordance with generally applicable rules of evidence
10 See P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117, an article
which was particularly formative to my thinking with respect to the paradigms discussed in this
part of the paper. See also N. Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1987) c. 5.
11 Griffith, supra, note 1.
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and procedure, that the subject freely chose to violate a clearly
expressed and legally enacted rule. The dynamic inner tension
within liberalism between the rights of the individual and the
interests of the community is played out doctrinally within the
criminal law in the form of parallel antinomies between "due
process" and "crime control," "intentionalism" and "determinism,"
"fault" and "harm," and "subjective" and "objective" forms of mens
rea.
12
Two forms of liberalism dominate the contemporary debate
over the role of the regulatory offence within the criminal law. I
have termed them classical and pluralist liberalism.13 In the balance
of this Part, I will first sketch out the contours of these two
perspectives, to put in context their respective orientations within




By classical liberalism, I refer to the natural rights-based
social philosophy which imbues the American Bill of Rights 5
According to this view, before politics or the state came the
individual. To advance his quest for self-realization,1 6 the individual
voluntarily associated with his peers in civil society contractually
creating the state. As a price of this association, he surrendered
12 Nelken, supra, note 8 at 113.
13 These terms are borrowed from Macklem's recent piece, supra, note 10. The
paradigms themselves parallel those set out in W. Christian, "Ideology in Canadian Politics"
in J.H. Redekop, ed., Approaches to Canadian Politics (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1978) 114
at 114-37, which the author there terms as "business liberalism" and "welfare liberalism."
14 These paradigms are intended and should be regarded as explicative, heuristic devices,
not as actual scaled-down models.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. Its best known modern ideologists are undoubtedly F.
Hayek, perhaps best known for his trilogy Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1982), and R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,
1974). For an unabashedly classical liberal critique of strict liability within the criminal law,
see J.L Hippard, Sr., "The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Law Without Fault: An Argument
for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea" (1973) 10 Hous. L Rev. 1039 at 1041.
16 And, of course, within this vision, the paradigmatic individual is invariably a "he."
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some of his natural pre-political autonomy, but retained a sphere
of pure liberty into which the state was forbidden to intrude as a
matter of natural right and law.
17
As Thomas Heller puts it, the "ideological centrepiece" of
this account of law and society is the "existentially free subject.
1 8
What defines this subject above all else is his capacity to choose:
his free will. It is on this basis that he is accorded moral respect
and is vested with legal responsibility.1 9 Within this perspective, the
market is accorded an almost magical status. Allowed to operate
freely, its invisible hand will reward the efforts of its rational self-
maximizing participants in accord with their skill and self-reliance.
The collective result of individual pursuit of self-interest will be the
maximization of the political and economic welfare of all.
The judicial role in classical liberalism is to stand above the
state and politics, dispensing justice by policing the boundaries which
mark out the private spheres of liberty for its citizens.20  Within
these spheres, individuals are regarded as fully sovereign: individual
rights trump collective interests every time. As one author has
concisely put it, within this perspective, individuals possess "an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a
whole cannot override ... the rights secured by justice are not subject
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests."
21
Not only does classical liberalism reject a utilitarian calculus,
but it contends that the good of all is served by the scrupulous
protection of individual rights. Since individual spheres do not
17 See, generally, A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The
Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278 and P. Monahan & A. Petter,
"Developments in Constitutional Law- The 1985-86 Term" (1987) Sup. Ct L. Rev. 69.
18 T. Heller, "Structuralism and Critique" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127 at 175.
1 9 Ibid.
2 0 Monahan & Petter, supra, note 17 at 75. See also D. Kennedy, 'Toward an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America,
1850-1940" (1980) 3 Res. in Law & Soc. 3.
21 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) at
3-4, quoted in MJ. Sandel, 'The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic" in A.C.
Hutchinson & P. Monahan, eds, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell,
1987) 85 at 88 [hereinafter The Rule of Law].
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overlap or conflict, there are no trade offs: judicial intervention is
costless and benefits all by keeping the state in its proper place.
22
The enemy of freedom, classical liberalism suggests, is the
state.23 Its proper role is strictly limited to enacting law, designed
to enhance the operation of the free market, by defining and
protecting property rights. Its tendency, however, is to expand
beyond this role and encroach on individual liberty. It is only
through the rule of law that the tyranny implicit in this inexorable
tendency can be curbed. Under the rule of law, all are subject to
the law equally and are accountable for their actions in the ordinary
courts of the land, in particular, the state and its officials.
2 4
Moreover, the law, specifically judge-made law, is supreme.
25
Impartial and objective, it stands high above the fray of civil society,
articulating and defending fundamental individual rights.
The judicial methodology of classical liberalism is highly
formalistic. Cases are characteristically decided by the application of
strict rules without explicit reference to questions of policy or
interests. In the realm of tort law, this formalism is combined with
a strong dose of moral individualism. Historically, the influence of
classical liberalism is reflected in various doctrinal principles which
allocated risk onto the victims of industrialization, deemed to be the
authors of their own misfortune, through such compensation-barring
devices as the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence, limited
liability, and privity of contract.
26
22 Monahan & Petter, supra, note 17 at 75.
23 Hutchinson & Petter, supra, note 17 at 283.
24 A. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in Englan4
During the Nineteenth Centuy, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1917). See also A.C. Hutchinson
& P. Monahan, "Democracy and the Rule of Law" in The Rule of Law, supra, note 21, 97 at
104-5.
25 For Dicey, the distinction between judge-made law or, as he also referred to it,
"judicial legislation," and parliamentary legislation was of crucial importance. In his view, the
role of judicial legislation was to maintain the 'logic or ... symmetry of the law," thus securing
conditions of certainty within the law as against the ever shifting currents of parliamentary
legislation. Ibid at 361-67.
26 T. Lowi, "The Welfare State, the New Regulation and the Rule of Law" in The Rule
of Law, supra, note 21, 17 at 25-29.
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Notions of fault and individual free will are also central to
the classical liberal vision of the role and nature of the criminal law.
Within this vision, the singular mission of the criminal law is a
desert-based retributive one: to punish moral fault. But moral fault
does not exist without free will. Accordingly, the state is forbidden
to punish the individual unless it first proves that he or she freely
and voluntarily chose to violate an explicit command of the law.
27
Within classical liberalism, therefore, the concept of mens rea is
highly subjectivist.28
This subjective conception of mens rea imagines a hierarchy
of culpability, which corresponds to varying degrees of intentionality.
The most culpable acts are those which are intended, less culpable
are acts committed recklessly, and least culpable (and not truly
criminal) are acts committed negligently. The degree to which an
accused can be said to have adverted to the illegal act is largely
determinative of the seriousness with which the law should regard
the act in issue and of the appropriate sanction upon conviction.
Accordingly, regardless of the harm that an activity may pose
or inflict, classical liberalism rejects fundamentally the notion of
harm-based criminal culpability (in our terms, absolute liability) and
is generally hostile to negligence-based criminal culpability (strict
liability).2 9 It contends that while the punishment of unintended or
negligent conduct may have superficial utilitarian appeal, it is unjust
since such conduct is unchosen. In support of this claim, it invokes
the image of the upstanding citizen who "could not have done
otherwise," helplessly ensnared by the criminal law.
30
27 Hippard, supra, note 15 at 1043.
28 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) at
149-57.
29 Perhaps the best known articulation of the classical liberal perspective on these issues
is 3. Hall's "Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability" (1963) 63 Colum.
L. Rev. 632. A more recent expression is R. Singer, "he Resurgence of Mens Rea: III - The
Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability" (1989) 30 B.C. L Rev. 337.
30 M. Kelman, "Strict Liability:. An Unorthodox View" in S. Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia
of Crime and Justice, vol. 4 (New York. The Free Press, 1983) 1512 at 1515, quoting H.LA.
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at 152.
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B. Pluralist Liberalism
Like its classical counterpart, pluralist liberalism is firmly
wedded to the ideology of the subject, tending methodologically and
normatively to elevate the interests of the individual over those of
the collective. But in many respects, pluralist liberalism's conception
of social and political life differs from that of its classical forerunner,
reflecting the distinctive late nineteenth/early twentieth century social
relations from which the former emerged.
Unlike its classical counterpart, pluralist liberalism is
pessimistic about the capacity of the free market to spontaneously
maximize the common good. The individual pursuit of self-interest,
within this perspective, is seen as leading to market failure which
results in costs being borne by the powerless and by communal
goods, such as the environment. Thus, within this view, although
the market has the capacity to enhance individual autonomy and
self-realization, it also poses a threat to these values.31
As a result, pluralist liberalism is less hostile towards the
state. In its view, the state must step into civil society to protect
social interests imperilled by the market, by regulating against its
excesses and assisting its victims3 2 The philosophy of modem
government in the pluralist liberal conception is utilitarian: its
mission is to maximize the welfare of all by carefully balancing
competing individual and collective interests. It seeks to fulfil this
mission through technocratic administration, under which law is
developed and implemented by expert bureaucracies guided by social
and natural science. While the rule of law remains a much revered,
rhetorical ideal, in practice it is eroded as increasingly particularized
regulation and administrative discretion become the norm.s3
31 Macklem, supra, note 10 at 136.
32 For a remarkably clear articulation of this perspective as a justification of the
regulatory offence, see the judgment of La Forest J. in Thomson Newspapers Ltd v. Director
of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, [19901 1 S.C.R. 425 at
502-17, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 at 472-83 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers cited to C.C.C.].
33 R. Cotterrell, "Feasible Regulation for Democracy and Social Justice" (1988) 15 J.L.
& Soc. 5 at 12. See also F. Neumann, The Rue of _Law (Dover, N.H.: Berg Publishing, 1986)
at 282 and N. Poulantzas, State Power, Socialism, trans. P. Camiller (London: New Left
Books, 1978) at 218.
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Within the pluralist liberal vision, political and social life is
a complex matrix of interdependent and cross-cutting interests, not
a simple map on which can be located well marked spheres of
individual liberty. Its notion of politics is that of the zero-sum
game: because politics involves choosing between conflicting
interests, there are inevitably winners and losers. It is likewise in
the judicial realm. Pluralist liberalism suggests that the complex and
interdependent nature of social relations makes it impossible and
undesirable to draw bright lines between conflicting entitlements3 4
The formalistic application of legal rules is regarded with disfavour,
replaced by an approach which seeks to do justice by balancing
interests and applying flexible standards3 5 In keeping with the
ascendant utilitarian ethos, this approach provides a justification for
giving priority to the "public interest" even at the expense of
individual rights.
In tort law, the ideology of pluralist liberalism is manifested
in various doctrinal and legislative developments - such as worker's
compensation legislation, the rise of strict liability, res ipsa loquitur,
and the abolition of the fellow servant rule - which purport to
provide redress for hardships imposed by the adherence to formalist
legal principles.3 6 The importance attributed to individual fault thus
declines as risk is increasingly socialized. As Lowi puts it, pluralist
liberalism implies a doctrinal shift "from private blame to public
interest and ... from individual responsibility to distributional
balance."
37
Pluralist liberalism also entails a reconceptualization of the
criminal law. Within this perspective, while the punishment of moral
Macklem, supra, note 10 at 136.
35 Horwitz contends that the first appearance in American legal theory of a "fully
articulated balancing test" was in an article by O.W. Holmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent"
(1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1. See MJ. Horwitz, 'The Place of Holmes in American Legal
Thought" in MJ. Horwitz, ed., American Legal History (Toronto: Faculty of Law, University
of Toronto, 1989) 169 at 227. On the ideological significance of the distinction between rules
versus standards, see D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976)
89 Harv. L Rev. 1685 and M. Kelman, "Interpretative Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law" (1981) 33 Stan. L Rev. 591.
36 Lowi, supra, note 26 at 26-27.
37 Ibid at 30.
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1991] Ideologies Clashing 715
fault remains a central role of the criminal law, it is not its exclusive
one. Apart from its retributive function, the criminal law is
conceived of as serving utilitarian functions, such as the prevention
of harm through education, general and specific deterrence, and the
rehabilitation of offenders. In short, pluralist liberalism represents
a perceptible shift towards a more harm-based conception of the
criminal law. 8
Nowhere is this shift more evident than in the orientation
within pluralist liberalism towards the regulatory offence. Pluralist
liberals conceive of the regulatory offence as being an essential
means of counteracting market failure, by instituting and enforcing
minimum standards of conduct in the marketplace?3 In their view,
these offences are more akin to the civil than the criminal law since
they generally relate to productive market conduct which is to be
discouraged, not punished. Penal consequences are attached to such
conduct, they suggest, for instrumental, rather than moral reasons.4°
Accordingly, pluralist liberals argue that, although regulatory offences
are prosecuted in the criminal courts, they should not necessarily be
subject to the traditional principles of the criminal law, particularly
its mens rea requirements.41
38 The pluralist liberal conception of the criminal law is nicely illustrated in Paul Weiler's
article "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea" (1971) 49 Can. Bar
Rev. 280 at 284. In this article, Weiler states that "the purpose of the criminal law is the
achievement of the object of the criminal law, which is the elimination or reduction of certain
conduct considered to be harmful, or otherwise undesirable" For a thoughtful consideration
of the relationship between negligence and criminal law from a pluralist liberal perspective,
see G.P. Fletcher, "The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis" (1971) 119
U. Pa. I Rev. 401.
39 See the reasons for judgment of Carthy JA. in R. v. Elis-Don Ltd (1990), 1 O.R. (3d)
193 at 213-24 [hereinafter Ellis-Don Ltd]. For further discussion of the case, see infra, note
102.
40 See Dickson J. for the court in R v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. Also see
the judgment of La Forest J. in Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 32 at 478-79.
41 The historical basis of the distinction drawn by pluralist liberals between true crimes
and regulatory offences is the ancient distinction, apparently dating back to the fifteenth
century, between offences contrary to natural law (mala in se) and those merely contrary to
positive law (malaprohibita). The pluralist liberal position is that regulatory offences fall into
the latter category because they involve acts which are proscribed "from motives of public
policy and not because of their moral turpitude or the criminal intent with which they are
committed" See F.B. Sayre, "Public Welfare Offences" (1933) 33 Colum. L Rev. 55 at 65.
The mala in selmala prohibita distinction is one which, particularly within the positivist
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C. Common Ground: Continuities Within the Liberal Vision
Despite the distinctions which can be drawn between classical
and pluralist liberalisms, fundamentally they are cut from the same
cloth, the latter merely an updated (though paradoxically, as I will
argue, less fashionable) version of the former.
While pluralist liberalism is less suspicious of the state than
its forerunner, like classical liberalism, it pictures the state as being
exterior to and an emanation of a pre-existing private civil society.
Within this shared vision, individual liberty and private property are
antecedent to the state, the latter a freely willed contractual creation
of rights-bearing individuals. The role of the state, mandated by
these liberal presuppositions, is to protect the pre-political property
rights and individual liberties of its creators and their heirs. What
is concealed by this private/public dichotomization of the relationship
between the state and civil society is that property rights and
individual liberties - in capitalist society, in any event - do not
precede, but rather are defined and created by state power.
42
Property, in its manifold modem forms, is wholly dependent on the
state for its recognition and enforcement under law. Similarly, in
the absence of the state, it is impossible to contemplate the notion
of individual liberty. Like property, it too derives its existence
directly from the state; for example, freedom of contract
presupposes state enforcement of "voluntary agreements." Thus
conceived, it is fallacious for the courts to suppose - when defining
spheres of individual liberty or balancing individual rights versus
collective interests - that what is at stake is whether or not the state
ought to "intervene." The state, as Monahan and Petter aptly point
out, is already there: the real issue is for whose benefit is its power
to be exercised.4 3
tradition, has been rigourously criticized, most notably by Bentham. See . Bentham, A
Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government, 3. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds
(London: Athlone Press, 1977) at 384-89. See also "The Distinction between Mala Prohibita
and Mala in Se in Criminal Law" (1930) 30 Colum. L. Rev. 74.
42 Cotterrell, supra, note 33 at 10.
43 Supra, note 17 at 76.
[VOL. 29 No. 4
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Classical and pluralist liberalism also share a distinctive
proprietary notion of liberty. This liberal notion of liberty
guarantees a negative liberty in the property of the self: a freedom
from state interference with one's person and property. 4  This
partial and limited notion of liberty ignores and tends to obscure
many of the most intractable and prevalent sources of inequality and
oppression within modem society. It offers freedom from the state,
but not from market forces, corporate power, racism, sexism, or
other forms of ostensibly private domination.4 5 For its part, pluralist
liberalism is not completely oblivious to the oppressive potential of
private power. Ultimately, however, its restrictive notion of liberty
as a claim against the state significantly constrains it from providing
redress, at least through the legal system, for the harms occasioned
by the exercise of such power.
Moreover, both liberalisms are characterized by a deep and
abiding commitment to the ideology of the rule of law. Within
classical and pluralist liberalism, the rule of law, as crystallized in the
notion of "a government of laws not men," is regarded as one of the
great accomplishments of the western liberal bourgeois revolutions.
To the extent that the concept implies equality of treatment for the
powerful and the powerless and represents a bulwark against
privilege and arbitrariness, it is an accomplishment which ought not
to be dismissed or belittled.4 6 And yet, like the liberal notion of
liberty, it too is a partial, limited concept which promises much more
than it delivers. The rule of law presumptively treats all legal
subjects - individuals, corporations, or otherwise - as equals. In a
society in which all such subjects were roughly equivalent in terms
of market power, the rule of law would, in theory, serve to reinforce
this equivalence. Under conditions in which market power is
44 On the concept of the "spatial self' within liberal theory, see M. Warren, "Liberal
Constitutionalism as Ideology' (1989) 17 Pol. Theory 511.
45 As Bowles and Gintis have recently put it, "Liberalism's fault lies not in overstating
the possibilities for human freedom, but in failing to identify the roots of domination - those
which lie in economic dependency and patriarchal authority chief among them - and in
elevating a radically individual conception of autonomy to the detriment of a conception of
community which might form the basis of democratic empowerment." See S. Bowles & H.
Gintin, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1986) at 176.
46 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (Middlesex Penguin, 1977) at 258-69.
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unequal, particularly where economic life is dominated by large
corporate entities, the tendency of the rule of law is overwhelmingly
to reinforce these inequalities. Thus, the significance of the rule of
law, as Neumann attempted to demonstrate, lies less in its refusal to
recognize the special claims of the powerful than in its wilful
blindness to the need for special protection for the powerless and
special control of the powerful.
47
And finally, a defining feature of both liberalisms is an
impoverished notion of the most powerful actor within contemporary
capitalism, the modem business corporation. During the late
eighteenth and for much of the nineteenth century, within political
and legal discourse, the corporation was broadly regarded as a
fictional entity created by a grant or concession of state power and
hence inherently vested with a public nature.48 As the importance
of the corporation as a vehicle of capital accumulation grew during
the heyday of economic liberalism in the latter part of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, this conception was
contested and ultimately supplanted. The corporation became,
within the newly dominant liberal discourse, a natural entity, the
Neumann, supra, note 33 (as cited by Cotterrell).
48 The dominance of the concession theory of the corporation during much of the
nineteenth century was the product of a confluence of a variety of factors, including the then
common requirement, upon those wishing to carry on business as a corporation, to obtain a
"special charter" from the state (which would typically stipulate restrictions on the type of
activities the enterprise could lawfully conduct) as well as the public-oriented nature of the
activities (Le., transportation and utilities) engaged in by early corporations. As the
significance of the corporation as a vehicle of capital accumulation grew and state restrictions
on corporate formation and activity lessened, a more privatized, personified conception of the
corporation began to achieve dominance. On theories of the corporation, see, generally, MJ.
Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited" (1985) 88 W. Va. L Rev. 173; GA Mark, 'The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law" (1987) 54 U. Chi. L Rev.
1441; W.W. Bratton, Jr., 'The New Economic Theory of the Firm" (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev.
1471; and D. Millon, "Theories of the Corporation" (1990) Duke LJ. 201. With respect to
Anglo-Canadian developments, the literature is much sparser. See L.C.B. Gower, The
Principles of Modem Company Law, 4th ed. (London: Stevens & Co., 1979) at 205-13; M.
Stokes, "Company Theory and Legal Theory" in W. Twining, ed., Legal Theory and Common
Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 155; and R.W. Baumann, "Liberalism and Canadian
Company Law" in R.F. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1991) 75.
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private product of entrepreneurial initiative and a quasi-individual in
the eyes of the law. 49
While I do not suggest that the respective postures of
classical and pluralist liberalism towards the corporation are identical,
ultimately, for similar reasons, neither comes to terms with the
realities of corporate power. Classical liberalism all but ignores the
corporation, imagining a world populated by individuals and the
state, subsuming the corporation unreflectively within the former
category5 ° Pluralist liberalism, on the other hand, recognizes the
economic and political significance of groups - including the
corporation - within modem social life, but tends to regard the
latter as an essentially benign force, attributing the various ills of
capitalist society to market failure rather than to relations of power
sheltered and promoted by the corporate form.5 In short, by virtue
of their shared private, personified conception of the corporation
both liberalisms obscure its status "as a forum of social power ... and
as a terrain of class conflict."
5 2
49 Horwitz argues that the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara Co. v.
Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which a corporation was for the first time
held to be entitled to constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment, is not the watershed
decision historians have often considered it to be. He argues that the process by which the
privatized natural entity conception of the corporation - which underpins its treatment as a
rights-bearing legal subject for constitutional purposes - gained ascendency was a complicated
one and further that this conception did not achieve dominance within legal discourse until
some twenty years after Santa Clara was decided. See Horwitz, ibid.
50 This is true even of modem-day classical liberals such as Hayek. His lengthy three
volume tract, Law, Legislation and Liberty, supra, note 15, published in stages during the 1970s,
barely mentions the corporation, and where it does so, it is in admiring terms. See vol. 3,
'Political Order of a Free People" at 77-83. See also Roberta Romano's discussion of Hayek
and the modem minimal statists in "Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform" (1984) 36 Stan.
L Rev. 922 at 944-45.
51 This blindness of pluralist liberalism to the dominant economic and political role
played by the corporate capital within western liberal democracies has of course provoked
spirited critiques even from scholars well within the liberal tradition. In the 1950s and 1960s,
many of these liberal critics could be grouped into what has been termed the elite theory
school, which took much of its inspiration from the work of C. Wright Mills. More recently,
this critical liberal tradition has been continued by the so-called neo-pluralists, including
Galbraith, Lindblom, and Lowi. See, generally, P. Dunleavy & B. O'Leary, Theories of the
State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (Basingstoke, Eng.: Macmillan, 1987).
52 Bowles & Gintis, supra, note 45 at 16.
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I. THE REGULATORY OFFENCE: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
A. The Pre-Charter Era
Prior to the 1970s, the status of the traditional absolute
liability-based regulatory offence within the criminal law was
relatively uncontroversial in Canadian legal circles. When it first
emerged in the late nineteenth century, there was some judicial
resistance to the notion of imposing punishment without proof of
mens rea, but absolute liability soon took root.53 With the rise of
the modem regulatory state in the post-World War II era, absolute
liability-based regulatory offences proliferated in a wide range of
areas, including worker health and safety, consumer protection,
market practices, environmental protection, and transportation.
54
The first sustained critique of the regulatory offence in the
Canadian context came in 1974 in a working paper prepared by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada (the "Commission") entitled
Criminal Law. Strict Liability.55 One of the main premises adopted
by the Commission was that there was a meaningful purposive
distinction to be drawn between real crimes and regulatory offences.
The purpose of the former, it asserted, was to punish conduct which
53 The historical development of the modem regulatory offence is described in Sayre,
supra, note 41. See also C. Manchester, "The Origins of Strict Criminal Liability" (1977) 6
Anglo-Am. L Rev. 277; and Singer, supra, note 29. Although, in his influential article on the
subject, Sayre emphasized the novelty of this development, a strong argument can be made
that the modem regulatory offence is essentially a modem statutory cousin of the common
law crime of public nuisance, which, like the absolute liability regulatory offence, rendered
criminal conduct injurious to public health, safety, or convenience without regard to the
intention of the accused. Indeed, R v. Stephens (1866), 1 Q.B. 702, generally regarded to be
one of the most important landmarks in the development of the modem regulatory offence,
was a case involving a nuisance indictment.
54 By the mid-1960s, cracks in the doctrine started to appear as courts began to attempt
to mitigate the perceived harshness of the absolute liability principle by developing a defence
of reasonable mistake of fact. See R v. McIver, [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (CA) and R v. VK
Mason Ltd, [1968 1 O.R. 399 (H.C.). See also G.L. Peiris, "Strict Liability in Commonwealth
Criminal Law" (1983) 3 Legal Stud. 117 at 124-31.
55 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Law: Strict Liabiliy (Working Paper
No. 2) (Ottawa: Information Canada, June 1974). Note that this is also cited by some as The
Meaning of Guilt Strict Liability.
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violated fundamental social values, while the latter existed to
promote standards of care in the marketplace.5 6 Notwithstanding
this distinction, however, the Commission argued that the latter
rationale - in effect, harm prevention - was not a sufficient basis to
justify punishment under the criminal law unless the accused was
afforded an opportunity to explain or justify his or her conduct.
5 7
In short, the basis of the Commission's critique of the
existing absolute liability form of the regulatory offence was
procedural fairness, that it was unjust to convict without permitting
a full answer and defence. In reaching this conclusion, it explicitly
rejected the argument that absolute liability was objectionable on the
ground that it unjustifiably interfered with individual liberty. In its
opinion, "the gain in terms of prevention of harm, promotion of high
standards of care and protection of the public welfare" outweighed
autonomy concerns, particularly in light of the unlikelihood that
conviction for such an offence would entail anything more than a
relatively light fine.5 8
In formulating its proposals for reforming the regulatory
offence, the Commission adopted a purposive, interest balancing
approach. Proceeding from its premise that regulatory offences
should promote standards of care in the marketplace and contending
that such offences were characteristically committed negligently, it
concluded that the appropriate standard of proof should be that of
negligence5 9 Because of concerns about prosecutorial efficacy and
means of knowledge, the Commission recommended that this burden
ought to be borne by the defendant. Accordingly, it recommended
that regulatory offences provide for a "due diligence" defence which
would entitle the accused to an acquittal upon establishing
reasonable care on the balance of probabilities. °
In making these proposals, the Commission explicitly noted
concerns that the creation of a due diligence defence "made it too
56 bid at 5-8, 31-33.
5 7 
Ibid at 21-25.
58 Ibid at 22.
59 Ibid at 32-33.
60 bid at 34.
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easy" for some defendants, in particular, large corporations. These
concerns, it promised, would be specifically addressed in a pending
Commission report.61 This latter report, Criminal Responsibility for
Group Action, was published in 1976.62 In it, the Commission
weighed arguments for and against extending to corporations the
benefit of its 1974 recommendation that negligence be made the
minimum standard of culpability for regulatory offences. Militating
against extending a due diligence defence to corporations, in its
view, were difficulties prosecutors would encounter in meeting
reasonable care defences put forward by corporate accused,
particularly in the case of large diffuse organizations.6 3 In addition,
it noted concerns about the increased cost and efficiency of
regulatory prosecutions in general. The countervailing and
ultimately decisive argument for the Commission, however, was one
of fairness: the proposition that, like an individual, a corporation
should be given an opportunity to explain or justify impugned
conduct.64
In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission contended that
the provision of a due diligence defence to corporations had the
advantage of "shifting to a public forum the adjudication of
standards by which corporations are to be guided ... [providing the
public] insight into corporate activities ... [and promoting] a gradual
raising of standards of care."65 Reflecting perhaps the tentativeness
of its views as to the advisability of the proposed reform, the
Commission recommended that the defence be extended for a trial
period so that its impact upon law enforcement could be assessed
before any permanent changes were made. 
6
In 1978, two years after these recommendations were made,
the Supreme Court, presaging the activist stance it was later to
61 kid.
62 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Responsibility for Group Action
(Working Paper No. 16) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976).
6 3 ]bid at 27.
64 kid at 27-28.
65 )bid at 28.
6 6 Ibid
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adopt under the Charter, introduced the due diligence defence into
Canadian law in R v. Sault Ste. Made.67 The issue in Sault Ste.
Marie was whether the offence of causing water pollution, contrary
to a provincial statute, required proof of fault. Dickson J., writing
for the court, approached the issue by drawing a distinction between
regulatory offences and the criminal law proper. In his view, the
former were
not criminal in any real sense, but are prohibited in the public interest ... Although
enforced as penal laws through the utilization of the machinery of the criminal law
... [they] are in substance of a civil nature and might well be regarded as a branch
of administrative law to which traditional principles of criminal law have but limited
application.A
In considering the merits of the mens rea issue, Dickson J.
stated that regulatory offences "lie in the field of conflicting
values."69  To decide the issue, he adopted an explicit interest
balancing approach in which he weighed the social interest in
maintaining and enforcing standards of public health and safety
against the individual interests of the accused. In his opinion, the
principal utilitarian arguments in support of absolute liability were
twofold: its deterrent effect in the promotion of high standards of
care and the exigencies of law enforcement. On balance, he
concluded these arguments were unconvincing when balanced
against, as he put it, "the generally held revulsion against punishment
of the morally innocent" which he suggested was associated with
punishment without fault.
70
Accordingly, while recognizing that the absolute liability
offence was "firmly embedded in ... Anglo-American and Canadian
jurisprudence," Dickson J. proposed that a common law presumption
against absolute liability be created, in the process, establishing a
new half-way house between mens rea and absolute liability offences:
the strict liability offence.71  In contrast to its absolute liability
6 7 Supra, note 40 [hereinafter Sault Ste. Mafie].
68 IM at 357.
69 bid at 362.
70 Ibid. at 363.
71 Ibid at 363, 373-74.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
counterpart, the strict liability offence would afford the opportunity
to advance a defence of due diligence, entitling an accused to an
acquittal upon establishing, on the balance of probabilities, a lack of
negligence.
The advantages of this new approach over a traditional
criminal mens rea model, in Dickson J. opinion, were not only that
it would relieve the Crown of the virtually impossible task of proving
"wrongful intention," but that it would impose on an accused, who
in the "normal case ... will have knowledge of what he has done to
avoid the breach," the obligation of coming forward with evidence
on the issue of reasonable care.72 This latter onus was, in his view,
particularly appropriate where the accused was a "large and complex
corporation."f
With the exception of some lonely environmentalists who
contended that the new regime made it too easy for corporate
offenders, in legal circles, Sault Ste. Marie was widely applauded
both for its judicial methodology and the substantive reforms it
initiated.74 Its quintessentially pluralist liberal interest balancing
approach, with its overt attention to policy and values, was seen as
a significant advance from the muddy formalism which had long
characterized the law in the area. As one commentator put it, the
decision represented "a genuine attempt to satisfy and reconcile the
cogent demands of ... manifold conflicting values and interests."75
In the period following Sault Ste. Marie, absolute liability
offences rapidly fell into disfavour with courts and regulators.
Employing its presumption against absolute liability, courts generally
read due diligence defences into ambiguous provisions, while most
new legislation was drafted on the strict liability model.76 To the
extent that the absolute liability offence remained in use, it was
72 ibid at 373.
73 bi.
74 See, for example, AC. Hutchinson, "Sault Ste Marie, Mens Rea and the Halfway
House" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 415 at 425; Webb, supra, note 5; and M.I. Jeffery,
"Environmental Enforcement and Regulation in the 1980s: Regina v. Sault Ste, Marie
Revisited" (1984) 10 Queen's L.J. 43.
75 Hutchinson, ibid at 437.
76 Webb, supra, note 5 at 435-39.
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generally limited to motor vehicle regulation and by-law
enforcement.
77
B. Charter Days: A Revival of the Debate
The battle between pluralist and classical liberalism over the
constitutional status of the regulatory offence has developed slowly.
The first skirmish in the Supreme Court of Canada came in 1985 in
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act.78 At issue was
whether a provision of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act79 violated section
7 of the Charter. Under this provision, it was an absolute liability
offence to operate a motor vehicle while prohibited from driving,
punishable by a mandatory penalty of seven days imprisonment.
Writing for the majority, Lamer J. held that the provision
violated section 7 and could not be saved under section 1. In his
view, what rendered the offence unconstitutional was the manner in
which it combined absolute liability with mandatory imprisonment.
In these circumstances, where "administrative law chooses to call in
aid imprisonment through penal law," section 1 would rarely justify
an otherwise unconstitutional provision °80 Accordingly, the decision
implied that offences which carried a potential term of imprisonment
must afford a defence of due diligence, elevating, in such
circumstances, the presumption against absolute liability introduced
in Sault Ste. Marie into a constitutional requirement.
To this extent, the Court attributed an absolute character to
the rights protected under section 7, but, in other respects, its
decision was carefully limited. The Court explicitly refrained from
deciding the constitutionality of absolute liability in the absence of
possible imprisonment. And, more importantly, the decision was
careful to leave open the issue of corporate liability. In this latter
7 7 Ibid
78 (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 [hereinafter Re B.C Motor Vehicle Act]. To date, it is still
the only decision of the Supreme Court to specifically address the constitutionality of the
regulatory offence.
79 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288.
8 0 Re B.C Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 78 at 313.
7251991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
regard, Lamer J. suggested that corporate accused may be unable to
invoke section 7 to challenge absolute liability on constitutional
grounds and that, in any event, different considerations would be
applicable to corporations under section 1.81
Until recently, the most significant appellate level case to
consider strict liability under the Charter was a 1989 decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal, R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.!2 This
was a prosecution under the Competition Act83 against a corporate
accused and one of its officers on charges of false advertising.
Upon conviction, the latter accused was potentially liable to a term
of imprisonment under the legislation. The Act contained a due
diligence provision, but stipulated that, as a precondition to relying
on this defence, an accused was required to demonstrate that a
prompt retraction of the impugned representation had been made.
The initial issue to be decided was whether the corporate
accused was entitled to raise and rely on Charter arguments put
forward under sections 7 and 11(d) by its co-accused. The Court
held that, while it was settled law that a corporation could not seek
declaratory relief under section 7 of the Charter, it was open for a
corporate accused to challenge the constitutionality of a law under
which it was being prosecuted.8 4 Following R. v. Big M Drug Mart,85
the Court stated that this conclusion was based on the principle that
"no one can be convicted ... under an unconstitutional law," a
principle inherent, in its view, in the concept of the supremacy of
the Constitution.
8 6
To the extent that the Act imposed a positive duty on an
accused as a condition precedent of putting forward a defence of
81 lbid at 314.
82 (1989), 73 C.R. (3d) 320 (Ont. CA.) [hereinafter Wholesale Travel]. A decision was
rendered by the Supreme Court on 24 October 1991. See infra, note 148. Recently, another
significant decision on strict liability under the Charter has been rendered by the Ontario
Court of Appeal. See Ellis-Don Ltd, supra, note 39. I will consider this decision in some
detail later in this paper. See infra, section III.C. at 731-35.
83 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
84 Wholesale Travel, supra, note 82 at 335.
85 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
86 Ibid
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due diligence, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that the
offence was tantamount to an absolute liability offence punishable
by imprisonment, and accordingly, applying Re B.C. Motor Vehicle
Act, was unconstitutional under section 7V87 Having reached this
conclusion, the Court proceeded to make a further, far more
significant ruling. Writing for the majority, Tarnopolsky J.A. held
that, even if the provision imposing the duty to retract were severed,
the legislation offended the presumption of innocence protected by
section 11(d) by imposing a reverse onus on an accused to establish
due diligence.88
This conclusion was based on a textual analysis of a
contradictory line of Supreme Court of Canada authority in the
criminal law area, which included R v. Whyte,89 the decision
ultimately relied on by Tarnopolsky J.A. in his majority reasons.
Whyte involved a challenge to a Criminal Code provision which
imposed on an accused, found in the driver's seat of a vehicle while
impaired, an onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that he
or she did not enter the vehicle intending to set it in motion. The
accused in Whyte argued that imposing this burden upon him to
establish a lawful excuse infringed his Charter right to be presumed
innocent. The Supreme Court agreed, but held that this
infringement was justifiable under section 1 in light of the social
interest in controlling impaired driving.
Without considering the appropriateness of following a
decision arising squarely within what is normally considered to be
the realm of the criminal law (Le., impaired driving) in the
regulatory context, Tarnopolsky J.A. held that Whyte was decisive
87 kid at 337.
88 kbid at 339-45.
8 9 R v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 97 [hereinafter Whyte cited to C.C.C.].
This line of authority includes R v. Holmes, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914 [hereinafter Holmes] and R
v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443 [hereinafter Schwartz]. Both Schwartz and Holmes suggest
the presumption of innocence does not apply to defences; only Whyte suggests that it does.
Moreover, in contrast to Whyte, the final case of the trio (Schwartz) involved a quasi-criminal
regulatory provision. Commentators suggest that these decisions cannot be reconciled and that
we must wait for the Supreme Court to set things straight. See, for example, I Weiser, "The
Presumption of Innocence Under Section 11(d) of the Charter" (1989) 31 Crim. L.Q. 318.
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and dispositive of the case before him.90 On this basis, the majority
in Wholesale Travel concluded that, by imposing an onus on an
accused to prove due diligence, the strict liability Competition Act
offences with which the appellants had been charged were
unconstitutional. Since the Crown made no attempt to justify the
challenged provisions under section 1, the provisions were struck
down.
The decision of the majority in Wholesale Travel marks a
departure from the dominant pluralist liberal discourse exemplified
in Sault Ste. Marie, a discourse which informs Lamer J.'s approach
in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act. In the tradition of Sault Ste. Marie,
Lamer J.'s latter judgment maintains a clear distinction between
regulatory offences and real crimes. The approach adopted is one
of interest balancing, and there is an explicit appreciation of the
unique problems associated with the regulation of corporate actors.
These defining features of the pluralist liberal approach are absent
from Wholesale Travel. The majority judgment unreflectively applies
criminal law jurisprudence in the regulatory context. Its approach
is highly formalistic and text-based, and its conclusion, concerning
the standing of corporations to seek Charter relief, is premised not
on policy considerations, but on an abstract conception of the rule
of law.
These differences between the judgments in Re B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act and Wholesale Travel are, in my view, ideological in
origin, reflecting an underlying tension between pluralist liberal and
classical liberal conceptions of the role of the regulatory offence
within the criminal law. To a large extent, the classical liberal
perspective which informs Wholesale Travel is unarticulated,
discernible only by deconstructing its methodology. In the debate
over the regulatory offence which has ensued since Wholesale Travel,
however, this classical liberal perspective has been elaborated in
more full blown terms. In the section which follows, I will examine
two significant recent elaborations of this perspective: a report of
the Ontario Law Reform Commission on provincial offences and the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ellis-Don Ltd.
90 Wholesale Travel, supra, note 82 at 343-45.
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C. Pluralist Liberalism Challenged. The Debate Heats Up
Prompted no doubt in part by the decision in Re B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act, in 1988 the Ontario Law Reform Commission
commenced a project designed to assess the implications of the
Charter for regulatory administration and enforcement. The
resulting report, entitled The Basis of Liability for Provincial
Offences,91 was published in early 1990. The principal recom-
mendations made in the Report can be summarized as follows:
1. Abolition of absolute liability for provincial offences and adoption of the
principle that liability for such offences be based on some minimum requirement
of fault; and
2. Elimination of the reverse onus due diligence defence and its replacement by
a regime under which, once the acrus reus was proven, an accused would be
presumed negligent until some evidence of reasonable care was adduced. Once the
trier of fact determined that this rebuttal evidence was sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to reasonable care, the Crown would thereafter be required
to prove the negligence of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
9 2
The Report proceeded from the premise that the criminal law
cannot legitimately countenance punishment without moral fault.
The Report took this proposition to be self-evident and uncon-
testable. In its words, it was "mandated ... by the dictates of
justice. 93
As framed by the Report, therefore, the question of whether
to retain absolute liability in the regulatory context was a moral one
which dictated its own conclusion: absolute liability was without
legal justification since it was morally wrong to convict an accused
of an offence, no matter how minor or trivial, without proof of fault.
In the face of this moral imperative, the Report concluded that the
standard utilitarian arguments favouring retention of absolute liability
should be rejected out of hand.9 4
91 Supra, note 7. The Commissioners responsible for the Report included a number of
leading judicial and academic figures, such as Rosalie Abella, Richard Simeon, and Robert
Prichard. The chief consultant to the Commission was Queen's University law professor Don
Stuart.
92 Ibid. at 41-51, 53.
93 Ibid. at 1.
94 Ibid at 42-45.
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In its consideration of strict liability, the Report contended
that the scope of an accused's Charter rights should not depend
upon the traditional distinction between real crimes and regulatory
offences since, according to the Report, many regulatory offences
were "serious both in terms of penalty and stigma."95 Accordingly,
the position adopted in the Report was that the individual rights
protected within the criminal law must be given equal protection in
the regulatory context. In its view, rights were rights; their content
had nothing to do with the context in which they were asserted.
Applying this principle, the Report concluded - relying
heavily on Whyte and Wholesale Travel - that the strict liability due
diligence defence violated the presumption of innocence under
section 11(d). Against the backdrop of this serious breach of
individual rights, the Report contended that practical concerns such
as access to the means of knowledge were not "a satisfactory
rationale for shifting the onus."96 In this regard, the Report made
the rather bewildering argument that, if real crimes could be
prosecuted effectively without the benefit of a reverse onus, so too
could regulatory offences. 97 The Report also emphasized that
regulatory offences involved activities which the state sought to
regulate not prohibit, implicitly suggesting that worthwhile productive
market activity was discouraged by strict regulation.
98
As a result, the Report recommended that the reverse onus
be eliminated and replaced by a regime under which, in conformity
with the presumption of innocence, the onus of proof would remain
at all times on the Crown. Under this new regime, once the Crown
established the commission of a wrongful act, in order to avoid
conviction, it would be necessary for an accused to raise a
reasonable doubt as to whether due diligence had been exercised in
all of the circumstances. The Report suggested that an accused
could accomplish this without calling evidence, simply by eliciting
favourable answers relevant to the issue from Crown witnesses. And
95 kid at 47.
96 1bid
97 1bid.
98 1bid at 45.
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once the matter was put in doubt, the Crown could only obtain a
conviction upon proving negligence beyond a reasonable doubt 99
Having made this radical and procedurally bemusing
proposal,l °° the Report made note of the argument that its reforms
might prove inappropriate to the regulation of large corporations in
the environmental, health and safety, and financial contexts,
particularly where the issue involved consideration of complex
internal systems only familiar to the accused organization or its
employees. The Report's response was that it disagreed with this
suggestion, contending that the presumption of innocence was "a
fundamental right that ought to apply to both individuals and
institutions.
'101
The most recent development in the ongoing debate over the
status of the regulatory offence is the decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in R. v. Ellis-Don Ltd]0 2 The case arose as a result of
the death of a construction worker at a work site. The general
contractor, Ellis-Don Limited, and one of its supervisors were later
charged under the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act 03
with failing to take safety precautions which could have prevented
99 Ibid, at 48.
100 The Report's proposals would require that the mens rea of regulatory offences
effectively be proven on a criminal reasonable doubt standard. The threshold requirement on
an accused to rebut negligence, applying their test, is essentially that of raising evidence to the
contrary. In criminal law, this traditionally has been a very low hurdle. In effect, it amounts
to any evidence supporting the position of the defence which the trier of fact is not prepared
explicitly to disbelieve. Moreover, once the trier of fact decides, after the Crown has called
evidence, that such a reasonable doubt exists, one wonders what, if anything, the Crown will
be able to do to eliminate that doubt.
101 Ibid at 48.
1 02 Supra, note 39. The full name of the decision is R. v. Ellis-Don Ltd; R v. Morra; R
v. Indal Furniture Systens Division of Indal Ltd and Bnil; R v. Helner Pederson Constuction
Ltd. These appeals were jointly heard as they raised the common issue of the constitutionality
of section 37(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, S.O. 1978, c. 83, which created a
statutory due diligence defence with respect to charges laid under the Act. Following oral
argument, the Court dismissed on the merits the Indal and Pedersen appeals, while reserving
judgment on the constitutional issue and on the merits of the Ellis-Don Ltd appeal. In written
reasons released on 3 December 1990, the Court allowed this latter appeal both with respect
to the constitutional argument advanced and on the merits, in the result ordering a new trial.
On 13 June 1991, the Supreme Court granted the Crown leave to appeal.
1 03 Ibid
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the accident. Under the Act, the offences charged were strict
liability in nature, imposing a statutory onus on an accused to
establish due diligence.
The constitutional issue on appeal was whether this reverse
onus was justifiable under section 1, since the panel hearing the
appeal considered itself bound by the conclusion reached in
Wholesale Travel that the due diligence defence violated the
presumption of innocence. In the result, the majority (Galligan and
Houlden JJ.A.; Carthy J.A. dissenting) held that the reverse onus
provision could not be saved.
In considering this issue, all three judgments in the case
applied the test set out in R v. Oakes.!0 4 In Oakes, the Supreme
Court of Canada established a two part test for determining the
validity of legislation under section 1. Only the second arm of this
test has relevance for our present purposes.105 It requires that to
be saved under section 1, an impugned provision must be rationally
connected to the broader objectives of the legislation, be the least
intrusive means to achieve those objectives, and affect the individual
rights of the accused only in proportion to the social importance of
those objectives.
In Galligan J.A.'s opinion, the reverse onus provision failed
to satisfy Oakes because it impaired the individual right in question,
the presumption of innocence, in a more intrusive manner than was
necessary to accomplish the objectives of the Act.1°6 In his view, by
requiring an accused to disprove negligence, the Act permitted
conviction to occur even where the trier of fact might have a
reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt. There was no compelling
justification, in his opinion, for this departure from the standard of
proof applicable in serious crimes. In his words:
104 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 [hereinafter Oakes cited to C.C.C.].
105The first arm of the test in Oakes is whether the objective of the impugned legislation
is sufficiently compelling to justify the overriding of a constitutionally protected right or
freedom. None of the members of the panel hearing Ellis-Don Ltd considered this aspect of
the test to be problematic for the Crown, which for the purposes of the inquiry under section
1, has the onus of establishing that the legislation is justifiable within the Oakes test on a
balance of probabilities.
10 6 Elli-Don Ltd, supra, note 39 at 204.
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I am seriously troubled about how it could be said that the objective of this Act is
so pressingly important that a risk should be taken of convicting someone who
might be innocent. Important as the protection of workers' health and safety in the
workplace may be I am unable to say that it is more important than protecting
innocent citizens from homicide. Yet the law does not permit the conviction of a
person charged with murder if the court has a doubt about his guit.
10 7
In a concurring judgment, Houlden J.A. concluded that the
reverse onus provision failed to satisfy the Oakes test on several
grounds. Like Galligan J.A., he emphasized the fundamental nature
of the right enshrined in the notion of the presumption of
innocence, as protected in section 11(d), and the possibility of
injustice inherent in the notion that an accused could be convicted
where there was a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt!08 In his
opinion, not only did the impugned provision impair the right to be
presumed innocent in an overly broad manner, but the nature of the
impairment was out of proportion with the objectives of the Act.
On this latter point he adopted, in whole, the recommendations of




In dissent, Carthy J.A. offered a spirited and vigourous
defence of strict liability in unmistakably pluralist liberal terms.
Before proceeding to a consideration of the Oakes test, he
undertook a purposive historical review of the regulatory offence
and of worker health and safety legislation. In his opinion, it was
essential to maintain a purposive distinction between real crimes and
regulatory offences. While the former merely punish breaches when
they occur, the latter, he argued, were part of an ongoing regulatory
process designed to achieve social objectives, in the present case, the
promotion of safety at work. 10 Regulation of this kind was
necessitated by market forces. As he put it, "where there is
necessarily a dependence on profits, measures are needed to assure
that workers' safety is not forgotten.ll' Accordingly, in his view,
107Ibid. at 202.
108 Ibid at 208.
109 Ibid. at 211-12. It is revealing to note that counsel for Ellis-Don on the appeal, Earl
Cherniak, was also one of the five Commissioners responsible for the Report, supra, note 7.
1 1 0 Ellis-Don Ltd, ibid. at 215-16.
Ill Ibid at 220.
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significantly different considerations applied when assessing the
constitutionality of regulatory legislation than arise in the criminal
law context.
Applying the Oakes test, Carthy IA. adopted an interest
balancing approach informed by these considerations. In the course
of upholding the Act under section 1, he made several observations
worthy of note. Under the least intrusive means aspect of the test,
he argued that advocacy of a reasonable doubt standard of individual
protection from conviction amounted to, in effect, proposing that
there be no intrusion on the right protected by section 11(d).
112
Moreover, to move from a reverse onus to a criminal standard of
proof would, in his opinion, make it virtually impossible to enforce
safety legislation due to the reluctance of workers to come forward
and testify for the Crown and the latter's inability to document a
lack of reasonable care without access to reliable documentation.
113
On the issue of proportionality between the measure adopted
and the broader objectives of the Act, Carthy J.A. pointed out that
although the potential penalties set out in the legislation included
imprisonment, no one had ever been sent to jail under the Act and
that its deterrent effect was financial 1 4  He also considered it
relevant to justifying the legislation under section 1 that the Act
precluded workers from suing their employers for tortious conduct
and, accordingly, the "deterrent effect of that common law right is
in a sense replaced by this regulatory statute which applies the same
test of conduct to the employer."
115
In upholding the reverse onus provision, he stated in
conclusion: "All rights and freedoms, once declared, tend to appear
absolute. Section 1 provides a means of restraint and balance
against that extreme to meet society's greater needs. Safety in the
workplace is such a need."
11 6
112 bid at 221.
113 Ibid at 221-22.
114 ibid at 223.
115 Iid. at 224.
116 Ibid.
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The decision in Ellis-Don Ltd is significant both in practical
and theoretical terms. At a practical level, if followed, it effectively
abolishes strict liability, eliminating for all intents and purposes any
meaningful procedural distinctions between the prosecution of
regulatory offences and "serious" crimes. At a theoretical level, the
decision is suggestive of the extent to which the assumptions and
approach characteristic of pluralist liberalism are under attack. The
majority decision in Ellis-Don Ltd, as with the analysis and
recommendations set out in the Report, reflect an emergent rights-
based anti-statism which departs unequivocally from the essentially
pro-regulatory orientation of pluralist liberalism. The pluralist liberal
vision of the role and nature of the regulatory offence, as reflected
in the work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada in the mid-
1970s and articulated by Dickson J. in Sault Ste. Marie, is now being
seriously challenged.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE DEBATE
It has been suggested that the Charter can be regarded as
symbolic of the pluralist liberal vision of the relationship between
the individual and the community.117 There is much to be said for
this thesis, particularly to the extent that the Charter, unlike the
American Constitution, explicitly invites the judiciary to balance
individual rights against the interests of "a free and democratic
society." Ironically, however, as I have tried to argue, an analysis of
the Charter debate over the role of the regulatory offence suggests
that pluralist liberalism is in decline, its discursive foil, a newly
invigorated classical liberalism, rapidly gaining force.
This recent challenge to the dominant pluralist liberal
conception of the regulatory offence is closely related to broader
social and political developments. For well over a decade, pluralist
liberalism has been on the defensive. The influence of its
underlying utilitarian faith in the ability of the state to successfully
balance competing social and individual interests has waned, replaced
by an ascendant rights-based ethic, which seeks to restore the
117 Macklem, supra, note 10 at 142.
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unquestioned primacy of the individual 18  The modern regulatory
state, which pluralist liberalism helped to create and ideologically
sustain during the post-World War II period, has been under siege.
The Right has aggressively sought its dismantling through
privatization and deregulation 19 And, even on the Left, the statism
characteristic of the pluralist liberal vision has fallen into disfavour,
in the wake of demands for democratization and decentralization of
state power!
20
Seen in this context, the debate over the role of the
regulatory offence within the criminal law is, at a more fundamental
level, a debate about the role of the regulatory state within civil
society. We have arrived at the end of a period dominated, within
legal discourse, by a pluralist liberal conception of that latter role;
the Dicksonian vision of the state is now being profoundly
contested 2 1 As this liberal consensus crumbles, we can expect
increasingly to hear the sound of ideologies clashing.1 22
Obscured by this rising din are crucial issues relating to the
actual and potential role of the regulatory offence in controlling and
influencing the exercise of corporate power. As Hutchinson has
118 For further discussion of the waning influence of utilitarianism, see Sandel, supra,
note 21 at 89 and H.L.A. Hart, "Between Utility and Rights" (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 828.
119 The type of state favoured by the neo-conservatives (or perhaps more accurately
"neo-Iiberals"), responsible for appropriating and reviving the discourse of classical liberalism,
is both minimal and strong. While these neo-liberals seek to deregulate and re-privatize
economic life on the basis of their often declared aversion to state control over civil society,
they also seek, in certain key respects, to increase state control over civil society by such
means of restrictions on trade union activity and heightened surveillance and demobilization
of internal dissent. While superficially these themes may seem incongruous, they are linked
by a free market logic which seeks to protect the individual from the tyranny of collectivist
threats. See J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988) and Bobbio,
supra, note 10 at 114-16.
120 See, for example, Keane, ibid; D. Held & C. Pollitt, eds, New Forms of Democracy
(London: Sage Publications, 1986); and P. Resnick, The Masks of Proteus: Canadian
Reflections on the State (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).
121 This is particularly evident in the Court's recent decisions on mandatory retirement
which hinge to a large extent on competing conceptions of the role of the modern state. A
pluralist liberal conception of that role is articulated in the judgment of Wilson J., while the
reasons of Sopinka . reflect a much more limited classical liberal perspective. See McKinnq
v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
122 Bragg, supra, note 2.
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recently argued, this might well be considered the century of the
corporation! 23 The pervasive and increasingly concentrated nature
of corporate power within contemporary Canadian society is beyond
dispute. 24 Today, our collective political and social life is shaped as
much by the ostensibly "private" decisions made in corporate
boardrooms here and abroad as by the decisions of public
representatives and officials. The anti-democratic implications of
these developments has been referred to by one critic as amounting
to a "refeudalization" of the public sphere 25
The debate within liberalism over the regulatory offence is
largely oblivious to these realities. Effectively ignored is the simple
truth that the harmful activities which this legal form is supposedly
intended to punish and deter, particularly those of a serious nature
- such as improperly transporting hazardous goods, carelessly
disposing of toxins, creating hazardous working conditions, and
forming combines - are overwhelmingly carried on via the corporate
form.1 26  Moreover, because of the complex nature of these very
activities, difficulties associated with proof of causation and the often
inscrutable inner workings of the corporate form, prosecution of the
regulatory offences involving corporate accused are particularly
daunting and will become immeasurably more so if the decisions in
Wholesale Travel and Ellis-Don Ltd are eventually upheld.
1 27
123 A.C. Hutchinson, "Mice Under a Chair. Democracy, Courts and the Administrative
State" (1990) 40 U.T.LJ. 374 at 379.
124 See, for example, J. Niosi, The Economy of Canada, trans. P. Williams (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1978) and J. Niosi, Canadian Capitalism, trans. R. Chodos (Toronto:
Lorimer, 1981).
125 J. Habermas, Stnducwwandel der Offentlichkeit (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1962) at
233, cited in Warren, supra, note 44 at 528.
126 The obvious exceptions to this proposition being motor vehicle and firearm
regulation.
127 If, as these decisions propose, the burden for proving negligence in regulatory offence
prosecutions is shifted to the Crown, it will have serious implications for the ability of the
Crown to enforce regulatory legislation involving corporate accused. This is not only because
of the practical difficulties which would likely be encountered by state authorities in obtaining
sufficient evidence of corporate negligence without running afoul of the Charter guarantees
relating to search and seizure and self-incrimination, but also due to the doctrinal
requirements imposed by the "identification theory" of corporate mens rea. Under this
doctrine, for the purposes of establishing the corporate mens rea necessary to obtain a criminal
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Classical liberalism simplistically collapses the debate over the
regulatory offence into a relatively straightforward matter of
individual rights. Proceeding from the premise that the criminal law
exists to punish moral fault, it considers the regulatory offence as an
essentially illegitimate attempt by the state to advance utilitarian
social policy objectives in blatant disregard both for the true purpose
of the criminal law and the basic inviolability of individual rights.
To the classical liberal, it matters not that the actors which are the
primary subjects of these regulatory initiatives are corporate entities,
since within this perspective the corporation is regarded, for all
intents and purposes, as a private rights-bearing legal subject.
While pluralist liberalism does not conflate the individual and
the corporation to the same degree as classical liberalism, it shares
with the latter an underlying commitment to the notion of the
corporation as an essentially benign or neutral private entity
organized to advance useful economic ends and capable, at least in
the criminal law context, of bearing individual rights.1 28 Where
pluralist liberalism departs from its classical counterpart is in its
notion of the criminal law. Rejecting the moral-centred essentialist
classical vision, it perceives the role of the criminal law as having a
significant prophylactic harm-based dimension. Thus, pluralist
conviction, only the intentions of those officials who could be said to constitute the "directing
mind and will of the corporation" are legally relevant. See Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v.
R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662. Application of this doctrine in the regulatory context would mean
that, even if the Crown could clearly prove negligence on the part of company employees in
connection with the infraction, the corporate accused would escape conviction unless the
Crown could also establish that the employees had sufficient authority within the organization
to qualify as its directing mind and will.
128 The ambivalent but ultimately privatized notion of the corporation within
contemporary liberal discourse has led to curious and contradictory results in recent Charter
jurisprudence. Thus, while corporations have been denied the right affirmatively to challenge
regulatory legislation under section 7 of the Charter, once they have been charged with an
offence under regulatory legislation, they are immediately transformed into full-fledged
constitutional litigants and accorded "individual" rights. See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 927 at 1004, where the Supreme Court (per Dickson C.J.C., Lamer and Wilson JJ.)
held that where there are "no penal proceedings pending" against it, a corporation has no
standing to seek declaratory Charter relief under section 7, thus distinguishing R v. Big MDrug
Mart, supra, note 85, in which a corporation charged with violating Sunday closing legislation
was permitted to invoke section 2(a) of the Charter (freedom of religion). With respect to
section 15, see R v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd (1989), 49 C.C.C. (3d) 267 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused 51 C.C.C. (3d) vii; and Edmonton v. A.G. Alberta, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, per
La Forest I. in dissent.
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liberals regard the regulatory offence as reflecting an appropriate
balancing of the social interest in regulating the potentially harmful
effects of market activity against the individual rights of those being
regulated. For pluralist liberals, therefore, the present debate over
the regulatory offence is essentially about defining the appropriate
limits of state regulation in the marketplace, not imposing
constraints on corporate power.
Thus far, the debate over the role of the regulatory offence
within the criminal law has been a debate carried on within
liberalism. Although spirited and punctuated at times by sharp
differences of opinion, arguably it could be said that it is a debate
within an ideology, not between ideologies.129 Regardless of one's
preferred characterization, it is a debate which critical legal theory
has to date largely neglected. While, in Canada and elsewhere,
critical theorists have long been concerned about corporate crime
and punishment, much of the work that has been generated has
sought to explain the prevalence of harmful corporate activity from
what might be termed an "external" perspective,130 often employing
sociological methodology.1 31 Within this literature, the failure of the
legal system to take corporate crime seriously is comprehended as a
product of constellations of economic and political power, which
have militated against the enactment and enforcement of regulatory
regimes which would threaten or in any way fetter the dominant
129 Christian, supra, note 13 at 124.
130 Alan Hunt makes the distinction between "internal" and "external" perspectives within
legal theory. He argues that conventional theorists (eg., Dworkin and Hart) adopt the former
approach, focusing on legal doctrine for its own sake without reference to law's broader social
role or implications. In contrast, those concerned with these broader questions (in Nelken's
words, "the contextualizers," eg., Cotterrell and Carson) have, he contends, tended to adopt
an external perspective, largely eschewing consideration of legal doctrine. In his view, one of
the distinctive features of critical legal studies is that, unlike the contextualizers, it does "battle
with liberal theory" on the latter's terrain by "taking doctrine seriously," while attempting to
maintain a critical distance. See A. Hunt, 'The Critique of Law:. What is 'Critical' about
Critical Legal Theory?" (1987) 14 J. L. & Soc. 5 at 10-13. See also Nelken, supra, note 8.
131 C. Goff & C. Reasons, Corporate Crime in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-
Hall, 1978); L. Snider, "Corporate Crime in Canada: A Preliminary Report" (1978) 20 Can.
J. Crim. 142; L Snider, 'Towards a Political Economy of Reform, Regulation and Corporate
Crime" (1987) 9 Law & Pol. 37; W.G. Carson, "Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability
and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation" (1970) 33 Mod. L Rev. 396; and W.G. Carson,
'The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime" (1979) 7 Int. J. Soc. Law 37.
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interests of capital. This tradition has contributed much to our
understanding of the political economy of corporate crime.
However, with a few notable exceptions,13 2 from a critical
perspective, consideration and critique of the form and content of
the criminal law doctrine and of the liberal ideological discourses by
which such doctrines are sustained has been lacking. As the debate
over the future of the regulatory offence gains momentum -
alongside a broader debate over the future of the regulatory state -
critical theory cannot afford to stand on the sidelines. As John
Keane has recently argued:
Neo-conservative ideologues and policymakers have promoted a discussion about the
limits of state-administered socialism with which democrats of all persuasions have
no choice but to engage ... The rich, if historic, vocabulary of neo-conservatism
(freedom of choice, individual rights, freedom from state bureaucracy) can be
neither confidently neglected nor left unquestioned.!
33
To the extent that critical theorists have considered the
ideological roots of the criminal law, the overriding tendency has
been to attack its individualist preoccupation with moral fault and to
advocate a more harm-based conception of culpability. Proposals of
this kind have been made in the context of feminist critiques of the
Criminal Code provisions governing crimes against women, most
notably with respect to the issue of the relationship between mens
rea and sexual assault.1 34 Likely, the most provocative and certainly
132 Deserving of inclusion within this category by virtue of their respective (and
distinctive) attempts to grapple with the ideological dimensions of criminal law doctrine are
Thompson, supra, note 46; D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay et.
aL, eds, Albion's Fatal Tree (New York. Pantheon Books, 1975) 17; H.J. Glasbeek "Why
Corporate Deviance is Not Treated as a Crime: The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word"
(1984) 22 Osgoode Hall I... 393; Kelman, supra, note 35; and N. Sargent, "Law, Ideology and
Corporate Crime: A Critique of Instrumentalism" (1989) 4 Can. J.L & Soc. 39.
133 The equivocal term "state administered socialism" in Keane's usage merely refers to
the Keynesian welfare state. See supra, note 119 at 10.
134 T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime" (1980)
30 U.T.L.J. 75 and T. Pickard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn"
(1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 415. See also S. Box, Power, Crinu; and Mystificadon (London: Tavistock,
1983). More recently, in their intervenor's factum in R v. Butler (argued 6 June 1991 in the
Supreme Court of Canada), the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund sought to uphold
the obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code against a Charter challenge explicitly on a harm-
based, as opposed to a morals-based approach, submitting that the impugned provisions should
be read so as to advance and protect the equality of women.
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far reaching harm-based proposal is that of Donald Galloway who,
with a view to "rationalizing" the criminal law, has advocated a new
model of criminal culpability under which all regulatory and criminal
offences would be designated as either "harm offences" or "attitude
offences," a categorization which would, in the former case, dispense
with the mens rea requirement altogether1 35
One of the few recent attempts to articulate a harm-based
conception of the regulatory offence is offered by Monahan and
Petter.136 They argue that, in addition to the traditional criminal
law purposes of deterrence and punishment, the regulatory offence
also serves "as a means of allocating social costs and of redefining
social responsibilities. ' 13 7  According to this view, the distinguishing
feature of the regulatory offence, and what justifies its treatment as
category sui generis, is its capacity to visit upon polluters and other
wrongdoers the social costs of their actions. Moreover, they
contend that the regulatory regimes governing such activities
represent a form of "social contract" under which corporations which
engage in potentially harmful enterprises must be taken to have
agreed to bear "a predetermined measure of responsibility if any
social harm results from their activities."
138
135 Galloway's proposal is both more sophisticated and (perhaps) facetious than this
description might imply. See D. Galloway, "Why the Criminal Law is Irrational" (1985) 35
U.T.L.J. 25.
13 6 Supra, note 17 at 96-98. See also Goff & Reasons, supra, note 131, cited in Sargent,
supra, note 132. Notably, however, even among academics who voice serious concerns about
the dangers of corporate power and the need for more effective regulation and prosecution
of corporate crime, there is considerable disagreement about the role of the regulatory
offence. Advocating a desert-based retributive approach to corporate sanctioning, Kip Schlegel
argues that strict liability statutes hamper the growth of "sound corporate criminal law" by
debasing the moral currency of the criminal law. Because, in his view, the criminal law is a
"condemnatory instrument," it should only be used to sanction immoral behaviour. Although
proposing an expanded notion of what constitutes immoral corporate wrongdoing, he argues
that where the activity is "unwanted yet morally neutral," and the object is to redistribute
social costs, civil or administrative remedies are more appropriate. See K. Schlegel, Just
Deserts For Corporate Criminals (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990) at 53-90.
137 Monahan & Petter, ibid at 96.
138 Abid It should be noted, however, that this conception of the regulatory offence
remains well within the pluralist liberal paradigm. In effect, the authors propose, in keeping
with the logic of a pluralist liberal position, that the regulatory offence be conceived of as a
market corrective mechanism through which full social cost of negative externalities associated
with a harmful activity can be imposed on the party undertaking that activity. The underlying
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These challenges to the moral-based notion of the criminal
law embedded within classical liberalism serve an important
corrective function, particularly in light of its increasing dominance
within legal discourse. For classical liberals to suggest that the
exclusive mission of the criminal law is to enforce morals is no more
accurate or legitimate than it is for them to claim that the purpose
of contract law is to enforce promises 39 While there is little to
be achieved by reviving the well rehearsed philosophical debate
between the moralists and the positivists concerning the nature of
the criminal law,140 critical theory can usefully respond to the
classical liberal position by attempting to undermine the essentialism
of its claims through elucidating their historical contingent nature1 41
Within the context of the current controversy over the regulatory
offence, this point could be developed, for example, by illustrating
the historical affinities between legal form and the social function of
the modem regulatory offence and the common law crime of public
nuisance. An endeavour of this type would, in my view, quite
effectively rebut the suggestion, implicit in the classical liberal
critique, that the regulatory offence is a recent invention of an
overbearing modem welfare state.1 42
But critical theory must be also prepared to challenge, both
within the context of the regulatory offence debate and beyond, the
privatized, personified notion of the corporation which informs
contemporary liberal legal discourse. To this end, much work has
purpose of the regulatory offence, within this view, is not to punish or proscribe outright
harmful activity, but rather to attach to it a higher price-tag.
139 See C. Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
140The literature produced by this debate is immense. A summary of the writing on the
subject is found in L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, revd ed., (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969) at 187. See also H.LA. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1963); P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965); J.M. Junker, "Criminalization and Criminogenesis" (1972) 19 U.C.LA. L Rev.
697; and J.H. Bogart, "Punishment and the Subordination of Law to Morality' (1987) 7 Oxford
J. L. Stud. 421.
141 A valuable contribution along these lines which considers the development of the
notion of mens rea within a framework of broader ideological and material developments is
made by P. Goldman in "Law, Ideology and Social Causality" (1987) 12 Queen's L.J. 472.
142 See supra, note 53.
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been done of late within American legal scholarship 43 This
growing literature has amply demonstrated the historical contingency
of the privatized notion of the corporation and Horwitz, in
particular, has contributed valuable insights into the relationship
between its emergence in the early twentieth century and the needs
of a rapidly expanding capitalist economy in which increasingly the
corporation was the key player. In the American context, the
consequences of assimilating the corporation to the status of a
natural person have been profound, not only by tending, within
political discourse, to insulate the corporation from state regulation,
but by serving as an explicit (but more often implicit) justification
for according to it a wide array of constitutional entitlements. As a
result, corporations have been able to resist, with considerable
success, various regulatory initiatives.144
What this suggests for critical theory, I would argue, is the
need to articulate a counter-hegemonic notion of the corporation
which emphasizes its unique status within, and correlative
accountability to, the polity. To this end, the traditional conception
of the corporation as having a significant public dimension, arising
both from its social impact and from the state's constitutive role,
must be revived and energized. In advocating this position, I do not
mean to argue that the dominant essentialist private conception of
the corporation merely be replaced by an essentialist public one.
Nor do I propose a return to the nineteenth century view of the
corporation as a purely fictional being, existing only in the
contemplation of the law. What I do suggest, however, is that both
for the purposes of considering the constitutional status of the
corporation in the criminal-regulatory context and for other more
143 Supra, note 48.
144 During the post-Lochner period until the late 1930s, this was accomplished chiefly
through the doctrine of "substantive due process" which enabled corporations, regarded
judicially as "persons" for the purposes of the 14th Amendment, successfully to challenge
redistributive and regulatory legislation. In more recent times, as this doctrine fell into
disfavour, corporations have managed to resist regulatory efforts by carving out new
constitutional protections for themselves under the Bill of Rights relating to free speech (1st
Amendment), privacy (4th Amendment), and due process (5th Amendment). See particularly
JJ. Flynn, 'The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood" in WJ. Samuels & A.S. Miller, eds,
Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibily (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) 131
and CJ. Mayer, "Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights" (1990)
41 Hastings LJ. 577.
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far-reaching projects,145 it is crucial to reimagine the corporation in
more public terms than we have become accustomed.
This proposal may be less ambitious than it might seem. It
is not only the legitimacy of the modem regulatory state which has
of late been undermined, a similar fate has befallen the modem
business corporation, as is evidenced by expensive recent efforts
undertaken by the corporate sector to rehabilitate its collective
image.1 46  The transformative possibilities presented by this
corporate legitimacy crisis should not be exaggerated, but neither
should they be entirely discounted. Moreover, despite the hegemony
of the privatized notion of the corporation within liberal discourse,
a competing public conception has never entirely disappeared. 147 In
American jurisprudence, for example, there remains a strong and
relatively modem undercurrent of authority which has denied to
corporations various constitutional rights relating to the regulatory
process - such as protections relating to search and seizure and self-
incrimination - on the basis of precisely such a vision. Thus, in
1950, the u.s. Supreme Court rejected a claim advanced by a
corporate defendant that it had been subjected to an unreasonable
search and seizure and denied due process in the following terms:
[Corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right
to privacy ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial
entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce. Favours from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in
145 In particular, the agenda of the "participationists" who seek to democratize the
corporation and its role within the market. See C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1970); R. Mason, Participatory and Workplace
Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); and K.E. Klare, 'Workplace
Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform" (1988) 38 Cath. U.L
Rev. 1. For a discussion of the participationist perspective within a broader context of
theories of the corporation, see Romano, supra; note 50.
146 HJ. Glasbeek, T'he Corporate Social Responsibility Movement: The Latest In
Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism" (1988) 11 Dalhousie 1.. 363.
147 For example, in Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 32 at 540-46, L'Heureux-DubC J.
explicitly invoked such a notion in concluding that corporations, as "creatures of the state,"
have limited rights under section 8 with respect to economic information sought by the state
for regulatory purposes. In adopting this analysis, she departed from the approach adopted
by the balance of the bench, both in this case and in its companion, R v. McKinlay Transport
Ltd, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 530 at 547. See infra, note 148.
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this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless
law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate
behaviour is consistent with the law and the public interest.
1 48
As we approach the end of the first Charter decade, the
question of corporate constitutional fights, particularly within the
criminal and regulatory context, remains an open one. The current
dominance within legal discourse of liberal ideology, whether in its
classical or pluralist guise, may provide to some little reason for
optimism that the evolution of Charter jurisprudence on this
question will do other than enhance the already powerful role of the
corporation within contemporary society. Nonetheless, the
ideological grip of these visions on the legal imagination is by no
means total. What the present debate over the regulatory offence
offers for critical theory is an opportunity to challenge the
hegemony of these visions.
148 U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 at 652 (1950) [hereinafter Morton], as cited in
H.M. Friedman, "Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant" (1979) 55
Notre Dame Lawyer 173 at 193. See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), where the
court, in a similar context, rejected an attempt by a corporation to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment. More recently, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ignored Morton Salt and expanded corporate privacy rights under the 4th
Amendment, employing a purposive approach focusing on the nature of the property interest
in question (Le., commercial premises versus dwelling houses) rather than on the nature of the
party advancing the claim. See, for example, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1977)
and Mayer, supra, note 144. This is precisely the approach adopted in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, in which the court was seemingly content to ignore
the fact that the defendant seeking protection from state regulators had "assets of over one
billion dollars and fifteen thousand employees." See M. Mandel, "Rights, Freedoms and
Market Power" in D. Drache & M.S. Gertler, eds, The New Era of Global Competition
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1991) 127. More recently, in Thomson Newspapers and
McKinlay Transport Ltd, the court, with the notable exception of L'Heureux-Dubd J., has
continued to conflate corporate and individual accused in its analysis of section 8. See supra,
note 147.
After this article went to press, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered judgment
in R. v. Wholesale Travel (unreported, 24 October 1991). In it, a divided Court upheld the
constitutionality of the strict liability offence and its reverse onus due diligence defence by a
bare 5 to 4 margin.

